Little evidence links the strategic decisions of campaigns to individual-level voting behavior. Yet for campaigns to matter in the way that experts argue, exposure to campaigns must also matter so there should be observable differences in the structure of vote choice between battleground and non-battleground states. Combining presidential campaign data with the Senate Election Study, we show that intense campaigning can activate factors like race, ideology, partisanship, and presidential approval. We find that the campaigns affected different variables in 1988 than in 1992, which we hypothesize is the consequence of campaign messages.
Introduction
An emerging scholarly consensus that campaigns matter in elections is built on evidence showing that the public reacts to campaign events (Holbrook 1996; Hillygus 2005) , the issue context of elections influences vote choice (Clinton and Lapinski 2004; Carsey 2000; Simon 2002; Popkin 1991) , and aggregate election results are related to campaign intensity (Shaw 1999a; Holbrook and McClurg 2005) . While such work refutes long-held notions that campaigns have "minimal effects," limits remain to our evidence on whether voting behavior would be different in the absence of presidential campaigns. In this paper we address this by examining whether the intense flows of information created by presidential campaigns in some locales but not elsewhere produce differences in voting behavior.
Unlike most previous research, we examine how campaign decisions create geographically-driven information contexts in order to explicitly link them to voter decision-making. In particular, we examine how fundamental predictors of vote choice like partisanship and presidential evaluation vary in importance across campaign contexts of different intensity. By combining survey data from the Senate Election Study with a unique measure of state-wide campaign intensity from the 1988 and 1992 presidential elections, our study makes two contributions to knowledge on presidential campaign effects. First, we show that individual voting can differ dramatically across campaign context thus providing rare individual-level evidence of campaign effects that result from the strategic allocation of campaign resources over the electoral map. Second, our results suggest a dependence of such effects between years on the choice of campaign message.
Though this second hypothesis bears further testing in future research, the fact that the variables which are more important in battleground states than non-battleground states varies across election years is highly suggestive of this point.
Research on Campaign Effects
For years, campaign effects research was plagued by a contradiction between common sense beliefs that campaigns influence voters and generally mild empirical evidence of such effects. Two arguments emerged as political scientist's reconciled instinct with evidence. The first is that campaigns are strategic, with opposing candidates concentrating resources on the same locations (Shaw 1999b (Shaw , 2006 (Simon 2002) , and contacting techniques (Gerber and Green 2004; Green and Gerber 2005) on voting behavior. Still others use quasi-experimental designs to gain significant leverage using data from real campaigns (Huber and Arceneaux, in press ) by focusing on voters in targeted media markets who are not in targeted states. The general consensus of these studies is that campaigns can influence voters.
A second perspective sees campaigns as a series of events that are related in time, with the people who run them making decisions on a day-to-day basis, often in reaction to events outside of their control. When such dynamics are ignored, the argument goes, changes in public behavior that occur during the election are overlooked. Accordingly, studies based on cross-sectional designs use an operational concept of campaigns that does not match reality and therefore find weak effects. Gelman and King (1994) , Holbrook (1996) , Wlezien and Erickson (2002) , Hillygus and Jackman (2003) , and Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson (2005) all use longitudinal evidence from within a single campaign cycle to illustrate the impact of specific campaign events on the electorate, while Shaw (1999a Shaw ( , 2006 specifically demonstrates the effect of ad buys and campaign visits on statewide and media market outcomes.
Though such research puts to rest lingering doubts about whether campaigns influence elections, there are still limits to what we know. For example, experimental studies convincingly establish that voters can be influenced by advertising content and polarity but ultimately do not show that they do influence them in the complex environments characterizing actual campaigns where strategy might minimize actual effects. Likewise, scholars interested in dynamic effects understandably focus on specific events (e.g., debates, conventions) or the impact of the campaign in its entirety (i.e., not measuring variation in campaign behavior), rather than the behavioral heterogeneity produced by campaign decisions that are reflected in geographic disparities in campaigning. What remains to be seen in this literature is whether real campaigns influence individual behavior in meaningful ways through their strategic decisions. What of voters in non-battleground states? Does our framework imply that they are choosing at random? Are they basing their votes on something other than information? In a word, no. We do not claim that voters in these states are uninformed or that their behavior is un-structured. Indeed, we fully expect that voters in the rest of the county are exposed to campaign messages through media coverage of campaign events, including those in the battleground states.
But in a very real sense, they are experiencing the presidential campaign much differently than voters in battleground states. First, they have less exposure to the specific messages, debates, and symbols that the campaigns use to influence voting behavior. Second, to the extent that they do receive campaign information, it is heavily mediated. As the media are more likely to present multiple points of view, provide alternative interpretations of issues and messages, and to focus on campaign strategy or horse race coverage, there is more ambiguity in what the information implies for voters.
Altogether this means that intense campaign environments create more opportunities for underlying campaign messages to get to voters and in such a way that the intended meanings are less ambiguous for voters.
As a consequence, if campaigns do in fact affect voting behavior by activating voter fundamentals with campaign information, we should find that voters in battleground states choose differently than voters in other states. If this is not the case and we do not observe differences between voters in battleground and non-battleground states, it importantly implies that campaign decisions about what to communicate, where to communicate it, and when are unimportant for how they influence voter decisionmaking. This in turn would imply a different model of "campaign effects" that downplays the role of resource allocation and highlights other considerations.
Data and Methods
Measuring the Battleground States. Testing our argument hinges on the fact that presidential campaigns do not distribute resources equitably across states (Shaw 1999a (Shaw , 2006 4 Including party transfers is important because they played an important role in presidential campaigns throughout the 1990s and because they are more widely distributed across states, thus providing additional variation in our key independent variable. We combine these three indicators by standardizing each within campaign year and then summing them together into a single measure of campaign intensity. This then is used as the basis for identifying the battleground states: those states in the top third of the summary measure in each of the election years.
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Since our survey data are for 1988 and 1992 (see below), we can establish validity for our measure by comparing it to Shaw's (1999b) With respect to specific coefficients we see that while many of the differences are trivial, two variables -ideology and race -stand out as significantly stronger in the battleground states than in other states. 11 We can gain an appreciation of the magnitude of these differences by turning to Figure 1 , which plots the probability of casting a vote for
Bush for different levels of ideology and race (all other variables set to their median values). Here we see a relatively flat slope for ideology in non-battleground states and a much steeper slope in battleground states. The total estimated difference in probability of voting for Bush between a very liberal and very conservative respondent was .14 in nonbattleground states and fully .39 in battleground states. The lower part of Figure 1 shows how race was activated by the 1988 campaign. Here we see that there was no racial gap in voting in non-battleground states but a substantial gap in battleground states, where the difference in the probability of voting for Bush between black respondents and all others was .33.
[ Figure 1 about here]
In Table 2 [ Table 2 about here]
An examination of the individual coefficients reveals some additional, mostly intuitive, differences between the two models. 14 First, the fundamental considerations of party identification and presidential approval are much stronger determinants of vote choice in battleground states than in other states. Not only is the difference in slopes statistically significant but also it is substantively very important. The top two panes of Figure 2 illustrate how the influence of party identification and presidential approval on vote choice is conditioned campaign intensity. In both cases the translation of attitude into vote is much swifter and stronger in battleground states than in other states. These differences are exactly what might be expected given our hypothesis.
We do have one important contrary finding in Table 2 Otherwise we are at a loss to explain this anomaly, except to say that the impact of economic evaluations is really quite meager compared to the impact of party identification and presidential approval. The bottom pane of Figure 2 makes this point fairly clearly. Here we see that while that while economic evaluations are of some consequence in non-battleground states (the slope for battleground states is not significant), their impact pales in comparison to the other considerations in Figure 2 and, overall, contribute much less to the overall explanation. Finally, the slope for respondent sex is significant and in an unexpected direction in battleground states but not significant in other states. While this is the case, the difference in slopes between the two samples is not statistically significant.
Why Does the Impact of Campaign Fundamentals Differ From 1988 to 1992?
While we expected to find that campaigns would influence the relevance of factors other than partisanship on voting, we did not expect to find that partisanship would not be activated in the 1988 campaign or that factors impacted by the campaign would matter significantly from 1988 to 1992. This raises an interesting question, though one we had not anticipated -why are these fundamentals influenced rather than others?
We are able to spin a post hoc answer that is related to the themes of the campaign that we believe has merit, though one that is admittedly is in need of additional empirical testing. In effect they argue that, as Truman shifted the focus of the campaign to class issues, he activated those considerations among his wandering supporters and they came home to vote for him. We suspect that this same argument applies to our data as well, with the type of issues raised by the campaigns influencing the type of fundamental considerations that loom larger in people's voting calculations across years. And, as campaign strategy provides for more intense, less ambiguous information environments these ought to have a larger impact on voters in battleground states than in non-battleground states.
At first blush, the cross-campaign differences are sensible. For example, the 1988 campaign was marked by racial overtones. Of particular interest here are the findings from Mendelberg's (2001) analysis, which showed that the Willie Horton ad (and coverage of it) not only primed racial attitudes but also primed ideology as an influence on candidate evaluations in the 1998 presidential contest. In addition, Gwiasda's (2001) finding that media coverage of the Willie Horton ad had an influence on general perceptions of Michael Dukakis' ideological position also buttresses our findings.
Similarly, Geer (2005, p. 91) shows that a key racial issue -crime -was intensely pushed by George Bush in his negative advertising (27-percent of all Republican negative ads that year).
In contrast, the 1992 is often remembered for emphasizing the poor performance of the incumbent administration, particularly with regards to the economy. In that sense, it is a classic retrospective-voting election with -importantly -blame focused on the tax increases agreed to by the Bush administration and responsibility for the economic downturn being laid at his feet by the Clinton campaign. Illustrative evidence comes from Geer's account of advertising in the 1992 campaign. The Clinton campaign ran over 30-percent of their negative ads on "economic times," while the Bush campaign ran over 30-percent on taxes (with Clinton running 17-percent of his positive ads on taxes as well, essentially claiming he would not increase taxes on any but the rich).
We would be remiss if we did not point out that accepting this as a possible interpretation requires us to believe that the economic question was less about feelings on the economy than it was a review of President Bush's performance and that we have no strong evidence supporting that assertion. Yet, it is not entirely inconsistent with other evidence on voting behavior in 1992, as well as our own finding about how economic factors behave as expected when incumbent evaluations are dropped from our model.
For example, Holbrook (1994) shows that consumer sentiment had an impact on candidate preferences that was roughly 1/3 rd as large as the impact as presidential evaluation in a model that controls for the sequence of campaign events, but not for geographical differences in campaigning. Similarly, Hetherington (1996) shows that the standardized coefficient for candidate evaluation -an indirect measure of presidential popularity -is roughly four times as large as it is for economic evaluations in influencing vote choice. While none of this is definitive proof of our assumption, it is generally consistent with the hypothesis.
However, we believe that this hypothesis warrants closer attention than we can
give it here. But more centrally for our argument, none of this is inconsistent with the original conjecture that the different information contexts created by campaigns ultimately matter for the final vote decisions made by voters on Election Day within the context of a single election. On that score, our evidence is not ambiguous.
Conclusion
The point of this paper is to demonstrate that the unique electoral contexts created by presidential campaigns affect the way that voters behave, specifically by influencing the relationship of vote choice to its fundamental predictors. Our evidence shows most fundamentally that voters behave in a more predictable fashion in intense campaign states than in low intensity states. Given that differences between states reflect information environments produced by strategic decisions made by presidential campaigns, this is a strong demonstration that the decisions made by campaigns affect election outcomes through how they structure voting. We also find that presidential campaigns enhance the effect of retrospective presidential evaluations and partisanship on the eventual vote choice in 1992 and race and ideology in 1988. Also of interest is that our interpretation of the cross-election differences suggests a link between the choice of message used in campaigns and the types of fundamentals that end up being significant for voting in the battleground states.
The primary drawback of our analysis is that we do not tackle the difficult problem of measuring campaign content. Even though the distribution of resources and the subsequent effect they have on voters is important, such strategic decisions are only a subset of what campaigns must consider. And given that campaigns coordinate their resources so closely (Shaw 1999b (Shaw , 2006 , it can be argued that the most important decisions presidential campaigns make are on how to pitch their candidate and his issues.
Our evidence, unfortunately, cannot determine which campaign had the better message.
However, the differences in the fundamentals that were important in 1988 -race and ideology -and in 1992 -presidential approval and partisanship -are consistent with conventional wisdom on the messages that dominated those elections and provides an intriguing hypothesis for future research.
Although the evidence is not without its limitations, it makes a clear contribution to our understanding of how campaigns affect voting behavior. Importantly, it buttresses an emerging theme in political science -modern election campaigns have substantial effects on election outcomes and voting behavior. In this analysis we have focused on an important element of this story; that is how campaign activity influences the mix of considerations people bring to bear on their vote decision. Other Battleground
Appendix A Measuring the Battleground States
We use a behavioral measure of campaign context to distinguish between the battleground and non-battleground states. We do this by measuring the relative intensity with which campaigns disperse three different types of resources -presidential ad buys, candidate visits, and party transfers -into the three states. While this undoubtedly misses some important sources of information (e.g., independent expenditures), it undoubtedly picks up the most important sources of cross-contextual variation stemming from presidential campaigns themselves.
To validate this measure, we compare it against an independent measure of campaign context that was based on qualitative evidence (see Shaw 1999b Shaw , 2006 for a discussion of how he uses campaign materials to establish campaign Electoral College strategies). In Shaw's classification, campaigns could view states as being (1) a battleground, (2) marginal and leaning toward one party, or (3) a base state that leans strongly toward one party. He then compares the intra-party classifications of both of the major party's campaigns in order to get some sense of which states were targeted in the 1988-2004 presidential campaigns.
Our approach is to examine which states were identified as a battleground by both major party campaigns, by at least one of the major party campaigns, or as marginal by both major party campaigns. The assumption is that these targeting classifications should make a state more likely to receive a significant amount of attention from the presidential campaigns and therefore an "actual" battleground.
Table A-1 reports the results of our comparison. All of the states listed in the second row of this table were marked as "battleground states" with our measure. The stars indicate their relative position in the Shaw ranking described above. As this table makes clear, our measure has relatively high overlap with Shaw's ranking. There is a 78-percent overlap in 1988, 82-percent overlap in 1992, and 80-percent overlap over both years. This suggests a substantial amount of content validity for our measure, though this is due in part to a large number of easy calls (i.e., states where there is no campaigning).
[ Shaw (1999b) . ) for a discussion of these issues.
Appendix B Variable Descriptions and Statistics
9 Given the focus of the Senate Election Study on congressional elections, other variables that are often included in presidential vote choice models, such as issue perceptions of presidential candidates, are not available in these data. 10 Testing for significant differences here is a bit complicated since we are not testing two different models, but rather the same model on two different samples. The method we used relied on running a model for the full sample and including a dummy variable for battleground states that was also interacted with all of the independent variables to express the differential impact of the model in battleground states compared to other states. We then did a χ 2 test for the joint impact of the battleground dummy variable and its associated interaction terms. This test (χ 2 = 12.83, p=.076) shows that the full model provided a marginally significant improvement in battleground states compared to other states. It is worth noting that the interaction slopes and t-scores from this model are exactly equal to the "slope differences" and associated t-scores in Table 1 . We chose to present the analysis by sub samples in order to make the differences as intuitively clear as possible. Again, though, there are no substantive differences between the interaction model and the findings in Tables 1 & 2. 11 Though we interpret these effects as campaigns activating these traits, we cannot exclude the possibility that campaign exposure increases attitude accessibility. It is also worth noting that effects of state context and/or additive effects of the campaigns that do not operate through individual traits have insignificant effects in 1988, as evidenced by the similar intercept values in battleground and low intensity states.
12 Because the dependent variable is trichotomous, we estimated coefficients and standard errors with a multinomial logit model. 13 Using the same method as used for Table 1 , the difference in models is statistically significant (χ 2 = 154.0, p=0.0000).
14 Unlike 1988, there are significant intercept differences in 1992. Not only is the baseline probability of voting for Bush significantly lower in battleground states than in low intensity states, but we see that there is a significantly positive probability of voting for Perot over Clinton in low intensity states that is not present in battleground states.
Interestingly, the fact that there are no significant differences in Perot voting in battleground and nonbattleground states lends weight to our argument since he ran a national campaign and did not over concentrate resources in specific states based on strategic considerations. 15 In addition, when approval is dropped from the model, the slope for economic evaluations is significant and in the anticipated direction in both battleground and nonbattleground states. 16 Because we cannot test a hypothesis from the data that produce it (King et al. 1994), we offer this as an avenue for future research on how campaigns mobilize voting populations. We particularly think that this is a promising avenue for linking research on campaign intensity to that on campaign messages.
